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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GLADYS P. HENDRICKS, 
Plaintiff, 
-v.s.-
BRIGHA~I VICTOR HENDRICKS, 
De f enda;nt. 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial 
District of the State of Utah, in and for Cache County. 
STATEMENT AS TO ISSUES 
On February 28, 1952, plaintiff filed for divorce 
alleging cruelty in general terms. On March 17, 1952, 
defendant filed his answer and counter-claim denying 
the allegation of cruelty on his pa.rt and by his counter-
claim he sought a decree of divorce from plaintiff on 
the grounds of cruelty. 
The trial court, with commendable patience, heard 
the evidence (which on plaintiff's part was offered 
piecemeal and could conveniently be stated like an opera 
as acts numbered one, two and three). After the closing 
chapter the court refused to grant a divorce to either 
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party and on his own motion prepared findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and a decree dismissing both the 
complaint and counter-claim. In its findings number 2 
the court expressly found that defendant was guilty of 
cruel treatment to plaintiff. In finding number 4 the 
court found that plainiff was also guilty of cruelty to-
ward defendant. Whereupon the court applied the 
doctrine of recrimination and denied each party any 
relief. 
It is self-evident that neither party was satisfied 
with this decree, but inasmuch as plaintiff has seen fit 
to appeal, it becomes respondent's duty to defend this 
action because, in the language of the trial court, we do 
not believe that the plaintiff can, by this appeal, become 
"lily-white" while the defendant is branded as the 
guilty party and charged with the responsibilities flowing 
therefrom. 
1. LAW. Before discussing the evidence it seems 
proper to refer to a few general statements of law. 
First: In divorce actions great latitude is. given the 
trial court and unless there has been a clear abuse of 
discretion an appellate court will not set aside the 
judgment. As stated by the court of appeals of Cali-
fornia in the case of Dup·es vs. Dupes 184 Pac. 425 
''Whether acts and conduct constitute such 
cruelty as warrants granting a divorce is a 
question of such nature that the conclusion of 
the tr-ial court is necessarily entitled to great 
weight and it is only where it is without any 
substantial support in the evidence that it will 
he disturbed on appeal.'' 
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This court has time and again announced the same rule. 
We do not belieYe that further citation of authority on 
this question is necessary. 
2. RECRIMI~y.._-lTION. __ The rule of recrimination 
is stated that '' \"\rnere each of the spouses has been 
guilty of misconduct "\Yhich is cause for divorce, neither 
is entitled to a deeree.'' \\T e have not found a case 
dealing "'ith the rule in this State and apparently appel-
lant has not. Therefore unless ''"'e have overlooked such 
a case it would seem that this court has never been 
called upon to pass upon this question. However, the 
rule seems to be established by the great weight of 
American authority. Without attempt~ng to exhaust 
the cases we cite the following from neighboring 
states: 
Blankenship vs. Blankenship 276 Pac. 9 (Anno-
tated in 63 A. L. R. 1127) 
Phillips vs. Phillip·s 236 P2d. 816 
DeB11rgh vs. DeBurgh 240 P 2d. 625 
Evans vs. Evans 157 P2d. 495 
Brazell vs. Brazell 129 P2d. 117 
Comfort vs. Comfort 112 P2d. 259 
Mueller vs. ~I ueller 105 P2d. 1095 
Heisler vs. Heiser 55 P2d. 727 
Chevez vs. Chevez 50 P2d. 264 (Annotated 101 A. 
L. R. 635) 
Smith vs. Smith 31 P2d. 168 
3. WAS THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE 
/ AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE? Plaintiff asked for a 
). divorce on the grounds of cruelty. Defendant in his 
answer denied this allegation and by counter-claim 
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charged plaintiff with cruelty. By a reply she denied 
the same. The issues therefore before the court were 
(a) Was defendant guilty of cruelty~ (h) Was plaintiff 
guilty of cruelty~ (c) Was neither party guilty of 
cruelty~ (d) Were both guilty of cruelty~ We cannot 
see how the issue of recrimination could be more clearly 
drawn by the pleadings. What more could be alleged 
by way of recrimination~ We say, therefore, that the 
rule was specifically raised by the pleading. 
However, we believe that under better reasoning the 
rule can he applied even though not specifically alleged 
as an affirmative defense. The rule of recrimination 
is based upon the equitable doctrine that ''he who comes 
into equity must come· with clean hands." The appli-
cation of this maxium bars relief to those guilty of 
improper conduct in the matter as to which they seek 
relief." (30 C. J. S. 475 Section 93) 
''It is not strictly or primarily a matter of 
defense, but is invoked on grounds of public 
policy and for the protection of the integrity of 
the courts.'' (See above citation) 
We cite the following cases which support this theory: 
Gynex Corporation vs. Dilex Institute 85 F2d 103 
Teuscher vs. Gragg 276 Pac. 753 
Eldridge vs. Eldridge 259 S. W. 209 
Richman vs. Bank of Perris 282 Pac. 801 
Smith vs. Ajax Pipe Line Company 87 F2d. 567 
In all these cases. the maximum ''He who comes into 
equity must come with clean hands'' was applied, when· 
ever the evidence disclosed a situation calling for its 
application. 
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,,re have heretofore cited a number of cases spec-
-ifically dealing w·ith the rule of recrimination. In most 
of these cases nothing is said about the rule· being an 
affirmative defense "\Yhich must be specially pleaded. 
Take for example the niuelle.r case. The issues were 
formed just as they a.re in the case at bar, and the same 
is true in at least most of the cases cited. 
Furthermore since the adoption in this State of 
the new rules, pleading·s have been greatly simplified. 
Only certain enumerated affirmative defenses need be 
pleaded. The list does not include the maxim ''He who 
comes into equity must do equity'' as an affirmative 
defense, which must he affirmatively pleaded (See Rule 
8 Sub-division C). 
As we view the situation the only question which 
can be raised on this appeal is resolved simply to a 
consideration of the question of whether or not there 
is substantial evidence to support the court's finding 
number 4 that plaintiff was he-rself guilty of cruelty 
toward defendant. If this finding is sustained on 
appeal, then the judgement must be sustained. 
FACTS 
While plaintiff has set forth in her brief a pur;.. 
ported stateme·nt of facts, we think a reading of the 
entire record will disclose that plaintiff has, in many 
respects, overstated or at least greatly colored the 
facts. Her statement of the facts would lead one to 
conclude that her testimony was the only testimony 
offered in the ease. This, of course, was not true. Then 
also it must be remembered that in a divorce action 
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the trial court has an opportunity to see the witness, 
consider her demeanor while on the witness stand and 
thereby obtain a better impression of the situation than 
can he obtained from reading the ''cold record.'' In 
this case plaintiff attempted to prove her case in three 
separate stages. On the first stage plaintiff testified 
in full and rested. A reading of this testimony is quite 
enlightening. She complained principally of money 
matters and interference by a son of defendant. She 
stated· that she had never lived on a farm before, that 
the firs~t year on the farm at Lewiston they got along 
p·retty well but tha:t the second year was not so good. 
There was family interference, and that she purchased 
part of the groceries ( Tr. 32) ; that she had an income 
of $115.00 a month which was later raised to $125.00 per 
month, which she spent for living expenses; that the 
third year matters got worse. There was family trouble 
with Vic's son and that on two or three occasions during 
the second year and possibly more frequently during the 
third year Vic would go away and remain overnight. 
''Our trouble was mostly bickering over money." 
(Tr. 35). . It is interesting to note that during her 
recital of family troubles, not a word was said as to 
defendant drinking to any exeess. Not a word was 
said about his carrying on with other women. Not a 
word wa1s said about so-called ''mash'' notes or any-
thing of the kind. In her own language their troubles 
were principally over money matters. She complained 
that ,Vic didn't give her all the· money that she felt she 
was entitled to receive, and she· claimed that she was 
spending the rentals collected by her for family expenses. 
On cross-examination she admitted that out of the 
monthly income· was dedueted the taxes on her own 
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property "'"hich amounted to approximately $25.00 per 
month. She also admitted that she had borrowed 
money from the bank and that $50.00 per month out of 
the monthly income '"'as applied to the payment of 
this loan (although she no"? claims that the loan has 
never been repaid). She also admitted that Vic gave 
her money but her sole complaint was that it was in-
sufficient to maintain her standard of living. The 
record showed that the plaintiff was the owner of 
considerable property, that she kept and maintained her 
own bank account, that she spent her own money as 
she saw fit without in any way consulting with her 
husband, that she operated her own automobile, that 
she made loans to her son by a previous marriage, that 
she purchased an automobile for him, that she was a 
woman of rather extravagant tastes and apparently 
quite improvident on the question of spending money. 
After she had rested her case the defendant testified 
· concerning the marital difficulties. He admitted that 
he had had some financial reverses, that he was heavily 
- indebted and that he was unable to give plaintiff all 
the financial aid which she seemed to demand. However, 
he furnished her a good home on a farm and contributed 
regularly to her support. He produced checks going 
back to the year 1945 (he was unable to find checks 
antedating this date). His checks showed that during 
::. the year 1945 he gave Mrs. Hendricks or paid out for 
~ her use and benefit the sum of $576.75; in 1946 the, sum 
s of $1059.67; in 1947 the sum of $1557.87; in 1948 the 
• sum of $2336.82; in 1949 the sum of $1303.80; in 1950 
~ the sum of $2787.07; and in 1951 the sum of $1672.04. 
(See plaintiff's Exhibit No. AA). He further testified, 
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and we think there can be no question as to this fact, 
that in addition to the checks above referred to he paid 
out in cash for groceries, household expenses, etc. addi-
tional sums which he could not specifically list but which 
he estimates to be nearly as great as the total amount 
of the checks, so that this was not a case where the 
plaintiff was left without means. It was a case where 
the plaintiff was discontented and disgruntled with 
living on a farm and not being given all of the money 
which she thought the defendant ought to supply her 
with. The cold facts are that the plaintiff simply did 
not like the quiet and somewhat secluded living on a 
farm, and she became dissatisfied. Imagine her com-
plaint that two or three times during a whole year the 
defendant remained away from home overnight, no 
suggestion of any improprieties committed by him at 
any time. 
The defendant then offered evidence in support of 
his answer and counter-claim. He testified, and there 
doesn't seem to be any particular dispute about it, that 
immediately following the marriage they established 
their home on the defendant's farm in Lewiston, that 
the plaintiff brought her furniture with her from Logan, 
that plaintiff /gave away most of defendants furniture 
to members of the family, that they completely re-
furnished the home and apparently made it very com-
fortable and livable. He corroborated the fa.ct that 
during the first year they got along very well, but 
apparently during the second and third years there 
was some discord, mostly money matters. Defendant 
contends that he gave plaintiff money regularly to 
support the family, which consisted only of the two of 
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.< 
~: 
them except for a period "~hen plaintiff's son lived with 
them, yet plaintiff appeared to be disgTuntled and dis-
satisfied. She didn't like living on a farm, she 
apparently did not care to mix socially with the farmers 
in Lewiston, she evidently had little to do and ·it is 
quite apparent that she beg-an showing· evidences of 
dissatisfaction. 
Defendant testified that they had very little trouble 
from the time of the marriage until 1946. He admitted 
that during this period of time he was away from home 
a few nights, during which time he was engaged in 
business transactions (Tr. 107-108), but he states that 
he did not think the plaintiff made any particular objec-
tion to that. During the summer of 1946 defendant's 
son returned from the Army. He was married and 
lived on adjoining property. Defendant had previously 
been in the dairy business and had the facilities for 
going back into the business, but lacked the capital to 
do so. He and his son had some discussion as to again 
restocking the farm with dairy cows and allowing the 
son to operate the farm. The evidence further shows 
· without conflict that the defendant was doing consider-
able trucking and as suggested he was he-avily in debt. 
He concluded, therefore, to make a loan from the Bear 
River State Bank in order to provide capital for 
purchasing some dairy cattle and pay some of his 
pressing obligations. However, when the subject was 
discussed with the plaintiff she objected .and refused 
to go along with the deal (Tr. 109), so defendant took 
the plaintiff to the Bank at Tremonton for the purpose 
of having her sign a note and mortgage. When she got 
there and learned the object of the visit she absolutely 
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and unequivocably refused to sign any note or mortgage 
and so they returned to Lewiston without closing the 
loan. No doubt a quarrel did ensue between them. 
Defendant felt that plaintiff should have joined with 
him in the consummation of the loan. She evidently 
disagreed and so without further ado she packed all 
of her belongings, ordered a van and left defendant's 
home practically stripped of its contents. She returned 
to Logan and refused to live any longer at Lewiston. 
At that time· she advised defendant that she needed no 
help from him and she could manage her own affairs 
without his assistance. 
There is some dispute as to the time before any 
attempted reconciliation was effected. Defendant con-
tends that he remained on the farm for better than a 
year. The plaintiff contends it was about three months. 
However, apparently the parties' attempted some kind 
of a reconciliation. Plaintiff in the meantime had re-
purchased her home which she had previously sold to 
her son-in-law and she had spent quite lavishly in re-
modeling, redecorating and refurnishing the same. From 
that time until the filing of the complaint there seemed 
to have been intermittent trouble between the parties. 
Defendant wanted plaintiff to come back to the farm. 
Plaintiff refused and insisted on living in Logan. This 
did not create an. atmosphere of good will between the 
parties. Defendant, being a farmer, had to leave early 
in the morning and if he put in a full day on his farm 
he could not return until late at night. This annoyed 
the plaintiff, she being used to city life felt that they 
should have an early dinner and she resented waiting 
dinner until his return, with the result that defendant, 
10 
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if he did come home .. would find it more convenient to 
eat at a restaurant. But on the contrary to avoid fric-
tions and turmoil he would remain for considerable 
periods at the farm, cooking his own meals and getting 
along as best he could. 
During this period plaintiff decided to further im-
prove her home and without any consultation with de-
fendant she incurred a debt in excess of $2400.00. She 
paid $1200.00 and demanded of defendant that he pay 
the remainder, which he did. This was a considerable 
time after he had borrowed the $1100.00 from her. He 
contends that this payment was made to her in discharge 
of the debt. She claims it was not. And so it went-
bickering- and turmoil in which plaintiff apparently 
contributed her share. 
Finally, because defendant came home whistling 
and in apparently a friendly mood, plaintiff called the 
officers and made the direct charge that defendant was 
addicted to the use of drugs and she wanted him ar-
rested. She made this charge on one or two different 
occasions. The defendant testified positively that he 
had never touched drugs, and the court found this to he 
true. After defendant had offered his evidence and 
rested, then plaintiff came to the second act of the play. 
She asked the court's permission to reopen her case 
when court reconvened on April 28, 1952, (Tr. 143.) 
Then for the first time she attempted to inject into 
the case the question of gambling, something she had 
entirely omitted in her case in chief. Her complaint 
seemed to he that the defend~nt sometimes. played the 
slot machines; however, it is quite apparent that the 
11 
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plaintiff enjoyed the same recreation except she con-
tends that she played with smaller coins than the de-
fendant. Appa:rently her greatest complaint arose from 
the fact that on one occasion while they were at Malad 
defendant won $50.00. Plaintiff asked him to split with 
her his winnings, and he gave her only $5.00, stating 
he was going to use the rest of it to buy a suit. (Tr. 
154-155). They then went to Downey and they played 
the slot machines, where he again won enough to pay 
for their dinner. However his luck changed and he 
lost the· $50.00 which he had won. The plaintiff's 
chief complaint, therefore, seems to be that the de-
fendant (foolish man) could not always win at the slot 
machines. 
She then for the first time injected into the ease 
allege4 intoxication of the defendant. Apparently in 
the first act of the drama she had neglected to mention 
either the gambling or the alleged drinking and had 
insisted that their principal trouble was merely over 
money matlters. On cross-examin~tion plaintiff ad-
mitted that she also partook of intoxicating liquors on 
occasions and that they had both drunk socially (Tr. 
158). The case was again closed. 
On Monday, June 9, 1952, further discussions were 
had with the court and the case continued until July 
7, 1952. After the court had indicated his views con-
cerning the matter, plaintiff's counsel stated that plain-
tiff wanted to testify again, and so on the 28th day of 
July, 1952, we entered Act 3 of the drama. 
After the court had announced how he felt about 
the matter and indicated an intention to find against 
12 
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both parties, the plaintiff moved the court to again 
reopen the case and allo""' her to offer further evidence. 
The court indicated some impatience with plaintiff 
because of the piecemeal '"ay in 'Yhieh she had presented 
her eYidence, but the court indicated that he would again 
allow plaintiff to offer some additional testimony of 
cruelty provided it 'Yas not cumulatiYe in character. 
The plaintiff then for the first time testified that 
she had g·one through the defendant's desk during the 
summer of 1951 and had found some so-called ''mash'' 
letters, which were marked AA, BB and CO. The 
plaintiff admitted that she had these exhibits in her 
possession and knew of their existence prior to the date 
of the trial. She offered no explanation as to why she 
had not gone into this question and offered them as a 
part of her case. It is true that after she had offered 
these exhibits the court struck the testimony, hut we 
fail to see 'Yherein the plaintiff was prejudiced in any 
way .by reason of this ruling because the court notwith-
standing his previous ruling included in his finding~ 
that "he exchanged 'mash' notes with women friends." 
This evidence which the court ordered stricken was the 
only evidence with respect to this matter and notwith-
standing the court's order he considered the evidence 
which was offered and made it a part of his finding. 
Irrespective of this fact plaintiff is in no position to 
complain because the court expressly found defendant 
to be guilty of cruelty. The only question which can be 
presented on this appeal is whether or not the court's 
finding of fact number 4 is supported by the evidence. 
We assert that the evidence hereinbefore referred to 
abundantly establishes cruelty on the part of the plain-
13 
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tiff. The defendant as the husband had the right to 
designate where the plaintiff should reside so long 
as he was providing a reasonably decent place for her 
abode. He was dut.ybound to provide reasonably for 
plaintiff's support, but he was under no legal obliga-
tion to do more than he was financially able to do. Cer-
tainly two people could and should have lived very 
comfortably on a farm on the amount of money which 
the defendant. gave to plaintiff by check and the addi-
tional amounts that he spent for groceries and other 
household expenses from cash in his pocket. If the 
plaintiff wanted to spend her own money she had that 
right, but she certainly had no legal grounds to com-
plain if defendant was doing all in his power to make 
her reasonably comfortable. The court found that the 
plaintiff deserted and abandoned the defendant's domi-
cile and residence at Lewiston and moved to Logan with-
out just cause and excuse. We think the evidence amply 
supports this finding. The court also found that plain-
tiff had been a frequent user of intoxicating liquors. 
This finding is amply supported by the evidence, as 
plaintiff admits that she and her husband both drank 
intoxicating liquors. 
The court found that plain tiff wrongfully refused 
to sign a mortgage to the Bear River State Bank, which 
mortgage was asked for in good faith by defendant in 
the furtherance of his business. This finding is amply 
sustained by the evidence. All of that property be-
longed to the defendant before the marriag·e. Admit-
tedly he was hard pressed for ready cash. He was at-
tempting to better his financial position and put him-
14 
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self in a position 'vhere he could eontribute more to 
plaintiff~ but plaintiff stubbornly refused to sign the 
papers, and then she precipitated a quarrel which led 
to her abandoning the defendant. 
The court further found that plaintiff wrongfully 
accused defendant of being· a drug addict to certain 
police officers of Logan, Utah, and attempted to have 
the defendant incarc.era ted and jailed on that charge. 
We think the evidence amply sustains this finding. She 
sent for the offieers and told them her husband was 
full of dope. If this charge were untrue, and defendant 
testified it 'Yas and the court so found, we can think 
of nothing which would cast a reflection on defendant's 
character more than to make such accusation to third 
parties. There was absolutely no justification for her 
- making such an ungrounded charge except to bring the 
defendant into disrepute. 
In addition to these facts we have heretofore sug-
gested the court was best qualified to judge the parties 
from their demeanor and behavior on the witness stand 
- and to draw reasonable inferences therefrom. 'Why 
- did the plaintiff elect to only tell part of the story then 
the going seemed to be tough add to the story and again 
a third time repeat the same procedure~ The court 
had a right to conclude and infer that plaintiff was 
not entirely honest and frank with the court. The court 
~· had the right to infer from the whole proceedings that 
~; much of the domestic difficulties was precipitated by 
the plaintiff's own conduct, so we contend that finding 
' number 4 is amply sustained by the evidence, and that 
~ ~ this court upon a review after indulging the trial court 
~n in a wide latitude of discretion should not disturb this 
·. finding. 
15 
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This leaves only one other point to consider. Coun-
sel for the plaintiff has spent a great deal of time in his 
brief in discussing the finances of the parties. There 
is no question but what both plaintiff and defendant 
owned eonsiderable property at the time of this ill-
advised malf"riage. Plaintiff\'s property was practi-
cally clear and not encumbered. Defendant on the other 
hand owed a good deal of money. From the start the 
plaintiff kept her own money and her own property 
entirely separate. She did not consult with defendant 
relative to the same, but spent it as she ehose. The 
plaintiff contends all of this money went for living 
expenses and proposes therefore to charge it all against 
the defenda<nt (See pages 9 and 10 of plaintiff's brief). 
He also contends that because plaintiff reeeived $21,-
065.00 net cash in October, 1946, and that she paid 
$6,000.00 for her home, $3,000.00 for remodeling, 
$2,750.00 for a car and at the time of the trial she claimed 
to have only $1,6.40.00 left which was represented by 
two United States bonds; that she had therefore spent 
$7,675.00 for household expenses notwithstanding the 
fact that plaintiff admits that she drew a eheck for 
$1,103.75 in 1947 for an automobile for her son and 
another cheek for $1,200.00 was paid to Raymond, the 
contractor, for additional alterations (See Tr. 162.) 
If plaintiff was so improvident with her money she is 
in no position to seek to reeover the same from the 
defendant, who had absolutely no say as to how plain-
tiff spent her money or what she did with it. If, as 
contended by plaintiff, she spent large sums of money 
for household e-xpenses, then we ask where did the money 
go which was admittedly paid to her by defendant~ How 
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could her living expenses be so great unless· plaintiff 
used her own money for extravagancies over which 
defendant had no control. We wonder how much of this 
money, if it was spent, went for needless things. How 
much might have been used for the benefit of her child-
ren who were in no way dependent on plaintiff for sup-
port. Certainly plaintiff was in no position to show 
that she ever gave defendant any money except one 
check for $5.00 during the period they lived togethe·r. 
Appellant also states that the defendant was the owner 
of two trucks in which he had an equity of about 
$4,000.00; however, his trucks are not paid for. Plain-
tiff also says that defendant is receiving a net rental 
income of $5,400.00 a year. This, of course, is not true. 
Plaintiff entirely overlooks that fact that defendant has 
a $20,999.00 mortgage on his property which requires 
periodic payments, and that the rent money has to be 
· · used for that purpose a.s well as for the purpose of 
paying taxes, interest on other indebtedness and in-
cidental expenses. It is, however, defendant's con-
tention that the judgment as entered by the court must 
he sustained; and therefore all questions relating to 
financial positions of the respective parties are of no 
concern on this appeal. 
We res-pectfully suggest that this c_ourt should 
sustain the judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LEROY B. YOUNG 
and 
HARVEY A. SJOSTROM 
Attorneys for Defenda;nt 
arnd Respo'YIJdent. 
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